Neuromancing the stone: Ludlam’s OzLog war


Technologists and civil libertarians remained riveted to their screens right around Australia today as the intimate details of one of the Federal Government’s most secretive projects came to light, inch by painful inch, in a tense exchange in a low-profile Senate committee late on a Friday afternoon.

The occasion was the maiden voyage of the Senate’s Environment and Communications Committee’s public hearing into the adequacy of protections for Australian’s online privacy. And the topic? The Attorney-General’s controversial data retention proposal, known popularly as ‘OzLog’, which could eventually see internet service providers required to store a wealth of information pertaining to every telephone call placed and every email sent in Australia.

Right from the get-go, it was obvious that the public servants who had been requisitioned to appear before the committee were aware of its tight OzLog focus, despite its apparent broad remit.

Senior AGD public servant Catherine Smith acknowledged this fact in the first comment in her opening remarks to the committee, before proceeding to deliver a prepared speech which stilled the presiding senators and the entire room as it disclosed substantially more detail than had previously been available about the scheme.

The disclosure immediately prompted a response from Greens Senator Scott Ludlam, who remarked it “probably doubled the sum total of public knowledge” about the proposal.

What followed afterwards constituted one of the most tense and fraught public discussions of technology policy to have taken place in the Federal Government over the past several years. As the afternoon wore on, Smith — the spitting image of a humble public servant, taciturn with her answers and wearing a nondescript grey suit — was increasingly pushed beyond her comfort level by Ludlam’s relentless questions on data retention.

The senator’s queries ranged across every front.

Smith claimed her department had consulted with a much “broader” range of stakeholders than it normally would for such a proposal — not just internet service providers, but also industry associations, other branches of government and so on.

“You seem to have missed out a lot — civil society: The public and the parliament,” shot back Ludlam, adding some of the ISPs had been required to sign non-disclosure agreements on the matter. “It’s a peculiar definition of broad in my book.”

The Senator told Smith there was virtually no reliable information in the public domain about the proposal — apart from a document which had been retrieved under freedom of information provisions — and splattered “with black marker”. “My definition of consultation is evidently a little bit different from yours,” he said.

Later, he tussled with Smith and her colleague Wendy Kelly about comments made by Privacy Commissioner Timothy Pilgrim about the OzLog proposal. “The privacy commissioner was pretty uncomplimentary,” said Ludlam — to which Smith rejoindered that in her opinion, Pilgrim had merely been “noncommittal”.

A key point which Ludlam pressured Smith on was the matter of where the proposal had originated — at the political level or organically within her department. “Presumably the Attorney-General didn’t wake up one morning to discover that you’re investigating data retention?” he asked. Under sustained questioning Smith said she didn’t recall where the proposal had originated — as it had been around for a long time.

There were other targets of Ludlam’s questions during the session. Later, Australian Federal Police high-tech crime chief Neil Gaughan told the committee it needed the data collected under the policy to maintain its crime-fighting capability. “Is anybody at the table willing to admit there are privacy implications in treating the entire population as suspects?” shot back Ludlam.

“At no point did you seem to have asked anyone: Is this a wise idea?” he added.

But by and large it was Smith that came under the most fire, as the visible public face of the proposal. At the end of the day, Ludlam told the public servant and her colleague that it was clear their project had not been driven from the political level.

He appeared amazed at the level of secrecy around the project, noting that to get any information about it, a Senate inquiry had to be initiated, and the media had to put in freedom of information requests. “Rumours flourish in a vacuum, and you’ve created a vacuum,” he said.

“If you don’t trust us to tell us what it is you’re doing,” he added, “why should we trust you to do it?”

If you look below the surface of the Senator’s interest in pursuing the data retention issue — and it was Ludlam that was the driving force behind the creation of the enquiry into online privacy to start with — it might be possible to see where some of Ludlam’s energy comes from.

One of Ludlam’s influences is the cyberpunk novelist William Gibson (author of Neuromancer), who throughout the 1980’s famously merged prophetic ideas about high technology with dystopian ideas about humanity’s hubris and the sort of decaying morals found in pulp detective novels.

It’s not hard to guess that throughout today’s proceedings Ludlam saw the potential for the OzLog proposal to lead the nation down the path further into the kind of dystopic surveillance state that Gibson could easily imagine. Bureaucrats in grey suits investigating secretive proposals for society-wide telecommunications interception — without an obvious political remit to do so? It does sound a little like a cyberpunk novel.

“Channeling @GreatDismal quite a bit in today’s #ozlog privacy senate inquiry,” wrote Ludlam on Twitter midway through the proceedings, referring to Gibson’s Twitter account. “If only I’d had the wit to call him as a witness.” And later: “@GreatDismal any chance of an Australian tour? Reading at Rose Street markets perhaps?”

And as the proceedings drew to a close, it appears Ludlam himself might have been feeling some of the gloom that fuelled Gibson’s Twitter handle. “I’m much, much more creeped out by #ozlog than I was an hour ago,” he wrote.

Image credit: Frederic Poirot shot of William Gibson, Creative Commons


  1. These revelations, where every one of us is treated as a suspect for as yet unidentified crimes…
    Created by the public service, with out knowledge of the parliament, yet alone approval.

    Who the hell do these people think they are. Surely a crime has been committed here, or do the “public” have no rights at all.

    Good on you Ludham.

  2. Just out of curiosity, if Ludlam get’s hit by a bus tomorrow, god forbid, which senators are likely to pick up the torch and let me sleep at night?

    And a shout out to Ludlam, if I every run into you I owe a drink or a meal or whatever the hell you feel like at the time.

    • Well, hopefully we’d get another IT-savvy Greens senator, but I doubt it. The closest we would get is probably Liberal Senator Mary Jo Fisher (also on the committee) who has a razor mind.

  3. Nice piece Renai, well captures the mood of the afternoon.
    There is a certain comic irony in the idea of the Greens public transport spokesperson getting hit by a bus.
    I will try and look after mself, but I suspect as with the filter there is discord or at least unease within the governments ranks as well.
    Letters and emails to the AGs office would be good, and letters to the editor and online news articles be timely as well.

    • Cheers! It was a fraught session … I cannot remember when I have seen a committee hearing so tense. I think everyone in the room was aware how high the stakes were.

  4. Wow, I was truly moved by Ludlam standing up for the little people. I had lost complete faith in the government for so long and to see someone actually doing something *for the people* is amazing. He’s a born leader, immediately took matters into his own hands to get the ball rolling. Good on ya mate

    • Hmm I’m not sure if he’s a born leader — I think of him more as a dark horse. But yes, it was inspiring seeing him uncover the secrets of the Attorney-General’s Department. It was a pretty pure expression of why bureaucrats are accountable to organs like Senate enquiries.

  5. Oh so the Police ‘need’ this so they can pursue criminals…bah. A new slant on an old saying “FRACK the PO Lice”

    Welcome to a Scared New World.

  6. I wonder if the “a vote for The Greens = a vote for Labor” critics will shut up now?

    1. If The Greens merely followed Labor then Ludlam would not be fighting this
    2. If the Libs had any balls they’d be pushing this committee too!

    THANK GOODNESS FOR THE GREENS and lets hope people realise The Greens are more than just dreadlocked tree huggers.

    • +1 to this.

      The Greens have consistently stated that they are not just going to agree to everything that Labor wants, the filter being a good example of this.

  7. Whoa, dial back the snowballing hysteria, people.

    As someone who has to tell countless members of the public that there’s nothing law enforcement can do about their small slice of the ever-growing [cyber]crime problem, I can tell you first hand that clear and generous retention laws have been necessary for a long time.

    Let’s not forget two important points:
    1. This is only metadata, not the content of communications
    2. Access is not unfettered and, depending upon the information requested, various requirements must be met before the information can be obtained.

    The current state of telco/ISP data retention is inconsistent and generally limited to the metrics which serve business purposes. Criminals utilise telecommunications systems every day to commit or enable crime and by not having access to that information, law enforcement is severely hamstrung in their ability to do anything about it. There are certain telcos in Australia which retain less data and these are heavily favoured by criminals. I can assure you this is not a coincidence.

    Nobody wants anyone – government or otherwise – to unnecessarily have access to information about them, but you’re living in a Hollywood-inspired fantasy land if you think mysterious government personnel are sitting around surfing your phone or internet histories just for kicks. Police don’t even have the people to adequately deal with the deluge of reports hitting their organisations each day.

    In my experience those who argue against this type of thing are typically the same people criticising law enforcement for their ineffectiveness or inaction. Many of them make a living creating mountains out of just this type of molehill. In this growingly connected world, the use of telecommunications metadata is the most effective aid to the investigations of crimes, and the most effective means of using your tax dollars to do so. In some cases it is the only means of investigation.

    Do I care that someone in law enforcement can – if they have reasonable grounds – can see that I only called my my mum once in the last month, or that I wasted an hour on YouTube today? It’s not ideal, but I’ll happily exchange that for them being able to catch a murderer or drug importer.


    • On the basis of the information they have (not) given us, the hysteria is warranted. They have not been forthcoming with any information. The entire existence of the scheme, let alone what it is & does (the little that we know), has had to be dragged out of them piece of piece.

      On that basis, I don’t want it regardless of the possible upside. If it has a genuine upside, they can be upfront & transparent about what it is, what is does & what benefit it could bring- and allow debate on that basis.

    • If this is to simply replace police access to obsolete telephone exchange information, then the only data that needs to be logged would be e-mail and voip call data on origin/destination/duration/time.

      Except that anyone with a rudimentery knowledge of the internet knows that to fully monitor communication activities online you would also have to log chat/irc protocols, social networking (facebook/twitter/etc), bbs…etc. And how/where do you draw the line if “the criminals”/”the terrorists” use encrypted web pages with logins to send messages to each-other? Are ISPs going to then have to keep a full log of web pages viewed, just in case?

      What use could all this information actually be? If police suspect someone of committing a crime they can get authorisation to tap into the web feed and actually see what they are doing. Much like they can get authorisation to tap a phone line…why do we need to keep logs?

    • I understand your position – I’ve worked with Lawful Intercept requests at several ISPs and some operators don’t have any procedures. I can see that consistency is required. Much of this is because keeping this data is expensive (gathering it in the first place) and recording it is not cheap. As you get larger, the costs scale beyond linearly.

      The bigger problem I have is that when the police are those doing the drug deals (look up Victorian Police: former officers Strawhorn, Patton, Rosenes, in particular), I don’t trust anyone having access to this data. If VOIP call logs are what’s wanted, that’s fine. Saying “you’re OK if you have nothing to hide” ignores the very corruption which affects those who avoid being the subject of corruption.

      As a Victorian, I’d far rather money be spent on a Royal Commission into public and police corruption, and a reduction of powers of the Police Association. The AFP Computer Crime unit needs more resources and more clue, I agree.

      What’s wrong with Lawful Intercept as it stands? You already have the right to tap internet communications.

      • There’s no doubt cost is a significant issue for carriers (and everyone really, because let’s face it – it’s just going to be passed on), but that’s a different issue to the one that was posed. When I’m feeling flippant my response to cost is usually as short as “4 billion dollars profit” or “condition of carrier’s licence”, but most of the time I do acknowledge that the cost and even physical storage requirements of such a project are not so simple. I even think that if the government is promoting an expansion of the various types of data stored – beyond what is required by business – then it’s probably not unreasonable for them to share in the cost, though finalisation of details for such an idea could quickly become protracted and complicated. Then of course you have the inevitable question of who stores such a mound of data if there is a shared cost. General opinion (especially places like here) would suggest that it being under the control of Government would be the least-preferred option, although this as somewhat ironic as – at least Federally – the Government has the uncanny ability to make much bigger hurdles for itself than even the most vocal of opposition groups.

        I find the broad stroke that police are corrupt and will misuse your data to be a little offensive, though probably no more offensive than a particular carrier would find me responding with “4 billion dollars profit” to complaints that retention is expensive. If we were going to have a serious discussion about it there’d be acknowledgement that abuse of a position of trust by a percentage of people is sadly part of human nature, but any such abuse is significantly lower in organisations such as police than in the private sector or even other government departments – lets not forget the effect of corporate abuses on shareholder or other public trust which are regularly part of headlines these days. The bottom line is that there will always be fringe cases, but vetting is the best which can be afforded with the funds allocated by government. Don’t forget this is law enforcement – you’re already trusting them with so much more, I think information about the number of times you voted in Australian Idol should be quite a way down the list of your concerns. Contrary to what your TV would have you believe, Constable Plod can’t sit down at his computer and look up your phone records with the push of a button. There are legislated requirements to be met and carriers sometimes take a long time to respond to such requests. They also charge money for the data, so expenditure must be authorised and attributed – yet another check and balance. It’s becoming difficult to see how your telephone call or other records could be abused by “corrupt police”, isn’t it.

        Not sure what you mean by AFP Computer Crime needing more of a clue (though this is not to say you are wrong). The AFP is quite limited in the matters it investigates, both by it’s size and by restrictions in the Constitution. In truth the vast amount of “cyber” or other offences are shouldered by the States, which have varying capacities. While it is easy to do, don’t mistake telco metadata to be purely of “cyber” interest. It’s use runs across all crime types and law enforcement simply can’t do their job effectively without it.

        Comparatively speaking, Australian lawful intercept legislation is quite good here, sure, but that really has little to do with the arguments surrounding data retention. And while I’m all for open and accountable government, this is part of the problem in having vast amounts of people arguing for or against processes while only understanding part of the various mechanisms. It’s like engaging in a technical debate over the adoption of one particular broadband technology over another – parties in the debate would rightly assume that the others are speaking the same language, all the way back to binary arithmetic. With a discussion such as use of telecommunications metadata by government agencies, it’s not possible for everyone to know all the gritty details and infinite permutations of how and why this data may be used in the course of investigations, so please don’t mistake me saying this as a criticism. It’s just a fact of life.

        Using the lawful intercept comments as an example, I guess I would say: “reasonable grounds to suspect” doesn’t grow on trees. The way investigations work outside of Hollywood is that they usually start from a very small piece of information which must be corroborated and analysed before the requisite bar can be reached for something like an intercept. One of the requirements of a warrant is (paraphrasing) that it is likely the comms service will be used by parties engaged in the planning or execution of an offence. What’s the least intrusive and ultimately best way to do such a thing? Communications metadata. If the information can’ t be corroborated or otherwise justified, you don’t get access to the more privacy-intrusive methods of investigation, which often means that there is no means of collecting the evidence required by courts… which means the criminals we all know and love continue to do what they do. As they get better at their jobs, collecting evidence gets harder as they are acutely aware of the limited means available for acquiring it. While we have pretty good legislation in Australia with respect to this, it does not mean that granting of such warrants is taken lightly by the issuing Judges – and if you present without having sufficient grounds, they will turn you away in a heartbeat, I can assure you. As they should.

        But in most cases intercepts aren’t required or appropriate. You might only need metadata to show a particular call/message came from a certain phone or email account to prove a case in court or point an investigation in the right direction. I don’t consider the collection of this information to be “making everyone a suspect”, and in fact it is often demanded by telco customers as they want to see itemised bills. The expansion of metadata types is simply a natural progression of the way we use new technologies to communicate. When the act was originally written they only had telephones in mind as that was the only means of distance communication. As those options have expanded for us it would be foolish to restrict ourselves by only allowing investigative agencies access to the original technologies in existence when the Act was created. What forms of communication do you think criminals would use if they thought that only one type could be tracked or monitored?

        • @Skinner. We largely agree.

          I think Ludlum and others, myself included, are worried about legislating beyond the equivalence of what exists on the voice application network – the PSTN – today. I’m all for there being mandatory requirements – and responsibilities, on all sides – in terms of data retention for _applications operating on the network_. My argument is that as a carriage provider, if I don’t provide applications – rather, just transit – why should I be required to keep Layer 3 snooping logs of my customers?

          Say my ISP doesn’t provide SMTP services – at all (webmail providers make my life 100x easier) – why should I be required to deep packet inspect my customers so that plod can see that they sent packets from here to there? The only reason I can see of here is that the webmail providers are often not Australian companies and the connections are international, so this makes interdiction difficult. International co-operation and legislation is the right approach here; not punitive Australian legislation to make operations more difficult for Australian businesses.

          This is my worry about the thin edge – where do we stop? As a network engineer and a business owner, I’m going to be pissed that network performance – something I pride myself on and my customers appreciate and pay for – is affected by this silent network equipment. Network taps still cause byzantine network failures if done by any mechanism other than an optical one, and even optical taps have their issues.

          So, in short – I agree with the general sentiment. The PSTN network is built for a single application – voice communications. To a PSTN engineer, the phone number is not like an IP address; it’s a “program”, used to program the connection of wires in the network. I agree whole-heartedly that the applications provided by an ISP – web proxies (transparent or otherwise), SMTP servers, VOIP handoff and VOIP/PSTN relays must be logged in accordance with legislated requirements. The government must accept that this doesn’t come for free and provide some mechanisms to encourage take-up (rather than just “the stick”).

          Providing tax breaks for ISPs to hire Australian engineers to implement such systems would be my suggestion.

          But here’s the rub. This move away from a network supporting a single application (voice) to today’s applications is the fundamental difference between the PSTN and the IP world. There is any number of applications on an IP network, including voice. To require that they are effectively snooped on at the IP layer is the wrong approach. The equivalent to the PSTN world call record logging is to perform the logging at above Layer 4, ideally at the application endpoints (i.e,. the SMTP/POP3/IMAP server, the HTTP server). To legislate further than that is to change the map entirely.

          To your other points:

          By “the AFP needs more clue” I mean the AFP CC unit should be staffed with more talented folks! Not that they need _a_ clue. I’ve found the feds to be very clueful in my experience and working under very difficult circumstances. You’re doing a difficult job, with poor industry processes and massive challenges.

          I presented the names of corrupt Victorian coppers mostly to show that there are issues perhaps the Attorney General should focus on – trust runs both ways, is all I meant. For the sake of the vast majority of coppers who don’t abuse their position, I wish more police would publicly call for such a Royal Commission in Victoria. Then again, the Brotherhood doesn’t appreciate a snitch, as we saw with the outcomes for officers who worked on Taskforce Ceja, so I get why they don’t. :-(

          • The transiting data is a good point and I hadn’t considered that before. It does raise some interesting issues. My 30 second consideration would go something like: As all of the legislation relates to carriers and CSPs – and hopefully content providers one day (thought I’d throw that cat amongst the pidgeons) – the collection really has to be at the customer’s on-ramp, it’s the only way it can work. I guess it’s a good demonstration how apples aren’t always being compared to apples when doing analogies between POTS and IP networks, and sometimes it takes a minute to work out where it broke down.

            I’m not sure that it is changing the map entirely. The object is still just to work out who is talking to who – the new services just have different equivalences for determining the best identifier, be it IP address, email address, phone number or otherwise. To me the problem is your point on *how* you obtain the new services identifiers – and that you’re suddenly having to do DPI on the flow, which I consider to be a big deal – not really from a privacy POV (because you can automate away any concerns over what might actually be captured), but from a performance/impact one. Not being involved in the process, your comment was the first time that had actually occurred to me. Maybe they can do it from logs rather than content inspection?

            I think that any form of collection at the higher layers should only be done if it isn’t going to effect network performance – any genuine hit there is definitely unacceptable in my books (as long as it’s not a carrier crying wolf because they don’t want to do it). From my experience, the various departments which have some regulatory role have always seemed reluctant to punish non-compliance or feet-dragging in the past, so I’d be shocked to the core if they suddenly started taking a hard line for 100% compliance at the expense of actually effecting the networks and businesses. Common sense would dictate that the transition would have to be gradual and allow for exceptions.

            Unfortunately international agreement on this kind of thing is measured in millenia and it’s really not practical to hold out for that. There are so many issues in that space and some are simply immovable – eg: for some countries they are prohibited from sharing the information, some countries can’t get it themselves, the international mutual legal assistance process is an archaic lead weight around the neck of cyber-cooperation in which requests and responses are measured in months or years, not the minutes or days required in modern cases. Sovereignty is still a big deal in the real world, regardless of how alien a notion it is in the cyber-world. I could drone on forever on that one but it really is largely a dead end – at least for any milestones which require results within a decade. Having said that though, there are people working constantly on those issues and wins tend to come in a spurts (even if they are staging a prison break with a tea spoon).

            Getting knowledgable people in law enforcement computer crime areas is definitely a big challenge. People spend entire careers aquiring the broad knowledge required for IT security roles, so having that and policing skills/experience is a rare. The bigger problem is the more senior officers who have spent their careers dealing with very different crimes and often have trouble swallowing that bad things in computerland can translate to the real world too.
            The AFP has spent alot of money over the years buying very capable people in the relevant fields, but its staffing is so wafer thin as it tries to do too many things that it never really made/makes effective use of them. The various State Police are in some ways the opposite – they still mostly have solid processes and frameworks but don’t have the budgets for fancy equipment or expert manpower (on the whole they’re remarkably effective for what they have got).

            Can’t really comment on the Vic Royal Commission points as I don’t really know much about the situation there. What I can say though is that it is surprising how fast cultures change and the bad old days are barely remembered or completely unknown to most. While I certainly take your point on sticking together as one can develop a seige mentality when, for example, all police are tarred by the actions of a couple, I’ve worked in several states and even that is largely gone. For the most part it just pisses them off as they know every incident like that just makes their job harder and reduces their effectiveness.

          • @skinner: “Maybe they can do it from logs rather than content inspection?”

            Routers don’t really (like to) do that. There’s Netflow, but routers can’t give you flowdata for every flow without significant performance impact (i.e., heavily limiting the total throughput). The old joke amongst router designers is “you can forward [the packet] or you can count [it]”…

            Folks do use Netflow, but in large networks, it’s often at a “sample 1 in every 2000 flows” rate, meaning it’s not useful for law enforcement purposes (why use it? it’s used for peering/network planning and DoS detection in this case).

            An important distinction I would point out: What you get today from the PSTN are phone number logs. Phone numbers don’t tell you who is talking; they merely tell you which phones (application end points) are in use. Without an intercept (either voice or unencrypted data) or other subject surveillance, one cannot make that assumption.

          • @Roo
            I was thinking more along the lines of mail server logs and http proxy logs rather than having to taste the stream directly, but I believe proxies have fallen out of favour with providers, so something else might be appropriate. If they HAD to do inspection to extract the required data I would hope that it would be from a pure mirror that didn’t sit in line and potentially degrade performance. I’ve got no experience with carrier grade gear though, so I’m talking a bit outside my expertise here.

            Law enforcement know all too well that the person on the other end of a phone isn’t always the person who it’s registered to :) Not even an attempt would be made to use something like that as evidence without corroboration. Email or http headers are just the same really – it gives a sense of communication patterns with minimum intrusiveness. Once you start gathering more information to build suspicion (which analysis of these records may add to) an investigator will plan actions based on this using a variety of other tools/techniques as the situation calls for.

  8. Yeah I agree that I thought it was unusual they held back so much. Not being involved in the process, I can only assume it is because of the usual public interest arguments that are made about investigative methodologies etc.

    There definitely needs to be a middle ground there – I strongly believe in protecting the information streams and methodologies as the information *is* misused by criminals. On the other hand, the “just trust us” line by government departments isn’t received well these days. While I don’t pretend to understand the structure and procedures of the various parliamentary committees, I’d have thought there would be a way to share the sensitive details with the committee members (the people’s representatives) while protecting it from full public release.

    I happen to know most of the issues around this particular topic so, despite the disclosure oddity in this case, my mind is at ease. Ordinarily I may not be so confident though (eg: Net filter).

    • To be honest, it appeared as if they were withholding this information from the public because the AGD bureaucrats just didn’t realise it was an issue. To them, it seemed to be a small continuation of what they were already doing — they appeared to have no understanding that they had stepped over a disturbing line with this.

  9. And this is why I voted for the Greens, would have directly voted for Scott, had I been in the right state.

  10. How is it that people get all worked up about the government requiring ISP’s to maintain a minimum amount of meta data, and yet no one is up in arms about all the corporations that track your internet usage through the use of cookies and other software such as google toolbar or other browser add-ons?

    This is simple metadata, information about information, yeah it could be used to track you but I dont see anyone removing there mobile batteries when not using it, or removing the GPS in-car navigation in newer cars that allow a person to remotely unlock there car or disable it so the police can stop a thief.

    • I am also concerned about this; I was shocked to find the other day that Google was storing what looked to be a large chunk of my search history, associated with my Google account. I deleted it immediately — but it did take me aback quite a lot.

  11. Matt, we spent most of the day talking about exactly that – new marketing techniques that effectively slip bits of digital junk mail out of every available channel.

    Most people are completely ok with that (i use gmail and facebook and accept the algorithmic intrusion as the price of using a free service) but i think we need to take stock of just how much information is being aggregated, who owns it, and what rights we retain to the datasets that pertain to us.

    for anyone interested in the full transcripts they’re here:

    tip o the hat to renai and a handful of others who rode shotgun the whole day. the committee will probably resume early 2011 and finish the job.

  12. Scott, thanks for your continuing efforts on our behalf.

    The previous Senate Estimates transcripts were a key element in me choosing for the first time to vote for the Greens (in both S.A. and Federal elections).

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